The flood that occurred in summer 1997 in Poland, affecting the drainage basins of the Odra and the Vistula, caused 54 fatalities and material losses of the order of billions of US$. The flood struck a large part of the country and caused inundation of 665 000 ha of land. The number of evacuees was 162 thousand. The rhetoric commonly used in Poland refers to the Great Flood of 1997 as an event whose scale exceeded all imagination about the possible size of the disaster. Indeed, historic maxima of river stage and flow rate were considerably exceeded. From the hydrological point of view, this flood was a very rare event, with a return period in some river cross-sections of the order of a thousand years and more. As this natural disaster, striking a dynamically developing country-in-transition, attracted much international interest, a holistic view of it is presented. Attempts to answer the questions: "Could the disaster have been avoided?" and "What lessons can be learnt from the flood?" are also made.
INTRODUCTION
The water resources of Poland are rather scarce. The average annual precipitation of 618 mm over the country of the total area of 312 000 km 2 , corresponds to a total * At the time of the flood: Deputy Minister of Environment Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry, Warsaw, Poland. " At the time of flood: responsible for the system of hydrometeorological forecast and warning in the boundary reach of the River Odra and the drainage basin of the Warta.
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precipitation volume of 193 km 3 of water (data from GUS (1996) , based on records for the period . It is estimated that annually about 55 km 3 of water runs off the land area of Poland. Dividing the total runoff by the number of inhabitants one gets an aggregated average water availability of the order of 1400 m 3 per capita. This is one of the lowest values in Europe. Indeed, over large areas of Poland, water deficit has been a common problem.
Throughout the thousand years of Polish history, there have been numerous occurrences of natural water-related disasters: floods and droughts. Girgus & Strupczewski (1965) provided information on extreme hydrological events in the preinstrumental period (from the tenth to the sixteenth century), based on written evidence. However, for several years before 1997, only minor floods had occurred in Poland. This had considerably weakened the awareness and preparedness of the nation.
In 1989, a time of dramatic changes to the political and economic system in Poland began. The country entered a period of transition from the rule of a communist party and centrally planned economy towards democracy and a market economy. The nation became aware of the emerging opportunity to catch-up with developed countries and immense needs in every area became apparent. Virtually every sector such as mining, industry, agriculture, transportation, army and police, education, health and social welfare, and others, requested more and more public money. Under such circumstances, and in the long-term absence of really disastrous floods, the expenditure on flood protection and flood preparedness was low and kept decreasing. Flood vulnerability and hazard were not being considered seriously by decision makers, political elites and the general public.
The Great Flood of 1997 came when the nation was preoccupied with President Clinton's visit to Warsaw, the invitation for the country to join NATO and, predominantly, with the forthcoming parliamentary elections in September 1997.
The Odra River basin
The Odra is the second largest river in Poland, after the Vistula (Wisla), both in regard to its length of 854 km, and the area of its drainage basin, 118 861 km 2 , of which 742 km and 106 056 km 2 respectively are in Poland. Its source is in the Sudety Mountains in the Czech Republic. With a length of approximately 162 km, part of the Odra forms part of the border between Poland and Germany. In its upstream course, the Odra has the features of a highland river, while in the middle and downstream course, it flows through lowlands. The mouth of the Odra is at the Baltic Sea, via Szczecin Bay. A map of the drainage basin of the Odra is presented in Fig. 1 . A number of big towns are located upon the Odra, most of which (such as Racibôrz, Ke_dzierzyn-Kozle, Opole, Wroclaw, Glogôw, Nowa S61, Slubice and Szczecin), are in Poland, while Ostrava and Frankfurt/Oder are situated in the Czech Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, respectively.
The hydrology of the Odra, whose long-term mean annual flow at the mouth is 575 m 3 s" , is characterized by a significant variability of flow. Typically, there are two periods of high flow. One is related to the snowmelt and ice melt time in spring and the other to intensive summer precipitation. Later, in summer and autumn, low flow situations do frequently develop. On average, the drainage basin of the Odra is a water-poor area. The long-term mean annual precipitation in the Odra drainage basin amounts to 592 mm, which is below the national average. The mean runoff in the drainage basin is low with the aggregate value for the whole drainage basin of the Odra being only 4.84 1 s" 1 km" 2 , which is around 153 mm annually. It is higher for the headwaters stretch of the Odra and for mountainous tributaries (e.g. from source to RaciborzMiedonia: 9.96 1 s" 1 km" 2 , and for the Olza: 17.5 1 s" 1 km"
2 ). In the nineteenth century, the River Odra as measured from Ratibor (Racibôrz) to Schwedt, was shortened by 26.4% by digging channels. Regulation has continued since then.
There have been numerous floods in historic times along the Odra, both summer rain-caused floods and winter floods, and consequently, a need has arisen for an adequate flood protection system. It consists of embankments, weirs, reservoirs (including dry flood protection reservoirs) and relief channels for the Odra and its tributaries, and a system of polders.
The flood of summer 1997 covered not only the drainage basin of the River Odra, but also that of the largest Polish river, the Vistula. However, the losses recorded in the drainage basin of the Vistula were significantly lower than those in the drainage basin of the Odra and this paper will concentrate on the latter.
ANATOMY OF THE GREAT FLOOD OF 1997

Meteorology
In the second half of June, the weather in Poland was shaped by cyclonic precipitation of high intensity and depth throughout the country, except in the northern and northwest parts. This precipitation filled much of the natural available water retention, saturating available soil storage.
The abundant precipitation from 4 to 10 July was caused by quasi-stationary atmospheric conditions with a front dividing humid air masses that significantly differed in temperature: hot and very water-rich air to the east, and humid and cooler polar sea air to the west. The two weather systems met over the Czech Republic and the southwest of Poland, covering the catchment area of the upper Odra and its tributaries, and stayed there for a long time, releasing large volumes of intensive precipitation, culminating between 6 and 8 July. The highest precipitation between 5 and 9 July was recorded in Lysa Hora, Czech Republic (585 mm), while in the Polish drainage basin of the Odra, the highest precipitation amounts were recorded in Kamienica (484 mm) and Miçdzygôrze (455 mm).
The heavy and long-lasting rains in the period 4-10 July caused destructive flooding. Yet, a few days later, from 15 to 23 July, another series of intensive rains occurred. The highest precipitation from 17 to 22 July was recorded in the drainage basins of the rivers Bystrzyca and Kaczawa (tributaries to the Odra; up to 120-300 mm), in the drainage basins of rivers , while in the Klodzko valley the precipitation totals reached 100-200 mm (Stachy & Bogdanowicz, 1998) .
A third wet spell in July 1997 took place basically in the drainage basin of the River Vistula. Figure 2 , produced by the Global Precipitation Climatology Centre (GPCC), presents the spatial distribution of precipitation over central and eastern Europe in July 1997 in relation to July averages based on 1961-1990 data.
Hydrology
The flood started on the Czech stretch of the Odra, where the severity of the event exceeded previous inundations in the twentieth century.
Three phases of the 1997 flood can be distinguished, each had distinctive features. The first phase was a fast runoff response after intensive rainfall in the upper Odra and its highland tributaries. In the first phase, the flood was very dynamic and destructive. The water level on the upper Odra rose by 4 m in 12 h. Flood rise in highland tributaries was even faster; the time lag between rainfall and runoff was short and, due to the absence of adequate water storage capacity, there was no way to avoid catastrophic losses. The flood struck the town of Klodzko (31 000 inhabitants) located on the river Nysa Klodzka. The town was virtually ruined, with several casualties and the destruction of numerous houses. Over 500 families in Klodzko lost virtually everything they owned.
Water level rise on the Polish stretch of the Odra started on 5 July and the peak stage exceeded the recorded maximum in Chalupki by about 30 cm. This exceedence was relatively small, due to a large area of the wide valley being flooded. In RaciborzMiedonia, the water level exceeded the maximum recorded stage by over 2 m.
In the second phase, a huge flood wave was already in the river channel of the Odra and it propagated downstream to inundate towns located upon the river. It was some time (of the order of days) before inundation of further towns took place. Due to the size of the wave it was not possible to avoid inundation of towns, yet some preparations have been made.
Having inundated the town of Raciborz (65 000 inhabitants), the River Odra devastated further large towns located downstream, such as Opole (131 000) and Wroclaw (700 000). The flood protection system of Wroclaw was designed for a flow rate of 2400 m s" 1 , yet the peak flow rate in July 1997 was nearly 50% greater. About one third of the city of Wroclaw was inundated. Much of the town was saved by massive flood defence, with street barricades, ad hoc levees and astronomical amounts of sandbags reinforcing the existing flood defences. A virtual street fight took place, to save individual streets or buildings.
Finally, in the third phase, high water levels reached the border stretch of the Odra and the lower Odra. The peak flow was reduced in consequence of the upstream inundations, so one could attempt to save towns and land. The measures taken were largely successful on the Polish side, while on the German side several breaches of embankments and significant material losses were recorded. In the border stretch and the lower Odra, there was more time for preparation, heightening and strengthening of embankments, collection and dissemination of hydrological forecasts and information. In Slubice, a town saved by massive defence, dikes were heightened by 1.2-1.5 m. (Kowalczak & Slota, 1998) .
It is estimated that in the period 7 July-14 August 1997, the cumulated volume of flow of the Odra at Gozdowice was 6.64 x I0 9 m 3 . This gives an impression of the gigantic volume of the flood wave.
Propagation of the culmination wave downstream along the Odra was long-lasting. From the Czech boundary to Gozdowice the average speed of propagation of the flood peak was 1.6 km h" 1 ; thus the propagation time was 16 days. The high water was of exceptional scale, leading to dike breaks and the inundation of vast areas. The wave peak flattened while travelling downstream and the return period of the observed peak discharge decreased.
The Great Flood of 1997 compared to other events
Summer floods in Poland, both in the Vistula and the Odra river basins, are not uncommon. They have been traditionally called Saint John floods and Saint Jacob floods, as they occur in June and July, i.e. near the time of the holidays (name-days) of these Saints of the Roman Catholic Church.
Floods on the Odra have been a frequently recurring phenomenon, yet they usually occur either in the upper and middle Odra (e.g. 1813 Odra (e.g. , 1854 Odra (e.g. , 1903 Odra (e.g. , 1977 Odra (e.g. , 1985 or on the lower Odra (1855 Odra ( , 1940 . Floods covering the whole length of the river have been more rare but usually very dramatic. The flood of summer 1997 was an extreme one in this category.
During the 1985 Odra flood, daily precipitation maxima were significantly (two to three times) lower than in 1997 and did not cover such a large area. Several all-time maximum stages were recorded in 1985. These were largely exceeded by the 1997 flood. For example, in Racibôrz-Miedonia, a stage of 838 cm and flow rate of 1630 m 3 s" 1 were recorded in 1985, as compared to much greater values of 1045 cm and 3260 m 3 s" 1 , respectively, in 1997. The flow rate of the exceedence probability of 1% (100-year flood) estimated in this cross-section, based on seven decades of records, is 1680 m 3 s" 1 . A stage hydrograph of the Great Flood of 1997 at the RaciborzMiedonia gauge is given in Fig. 3 . The gauge was overtopped and destroyed, thus the continuity of records was broken.
In Opole, on the Odra, water levels outstripped the absolute historic maximum by 173 cm (777 cm in 1997, as compared to 604 cm in 1813 and 584 cm in 1985) and the peak flow reached 3500 m s" . At Klodzko, on the Nysa Klodzka River, the historic stage record was exceeded by 70 cm. It is estimated that the unit runoff reached the order of 1300 1 s" 1 km" 2 . Klodzko was devastated in 1997, yet other destructive flood disasters have also occurred in this town throughout history. For example, in July 1310, a large flood inundated the suburbs killing between 1500 and 2000 people (Girgus & Strupczewski, 1965) .
Since historic flow data are typically only available for an observation period of several decades to a century, assessing the exceedence probability for such a rare event as the Great Flood of 1997 can only be based on an extensive, thus not very credible extrapolation. This is the best one can do. Yet, making inferences on the tails of probability distributions strongly depends on the subjective choice of the distribution. Without wishing to participate in the recent dispute on the return periods of very rare events, one could compare, for perspective, the observed values with those calculated as rough characteristics of 1000 and 10 000 year floods (Griinewald, 1998) and see that at several gauges, the peak flow in July 1997 was within this range.
The Great Flood of 1997 on the Odra was long lasting as the wave travelled slowly downstream. The alarm levels were continually exceeded for several weeks: for 16 days in Miedonia, 17 days in Opole, 32 days in Scinawa, 36 days in Glogow, 35 days in Polçcko, and 34 days in Slubice. The exceedence of historic absolute maximum water level lasted 4-7 days on the upper Odra to about 16 days in Polçcko (cf. IMGW, 1997; Kowalczak & Kleinhardt 1997) .
The Great Flood of 1997 had two crests corresponding to two periods of precipitation (4-10 July and 15-23 July). During the first peak of the flood wave, the all-time highest stage and flow between the Czech-Polish border and Nowa Sol were broken, while during the second, the maxima were reached from Cigacice to Gozdowice. Propagation of the flood wave on the Odra in July 1997 is illustrated in Fig. 4 , where water levels in July 1997 are compared to historical records. Before 1997, the most dramatic flood event of the century in Poland was the deluge of the Vistula and its upstream south bank tributaries in summer 1934. The inundated area of 1260 km was nearly twice that in 1997, while the number of fatalities was comparable (55 vs 54).
Precipitation, the main cause of the Great Flood of 1997 was intensive and longlasting but not exceptional by world standards. The world record 24-h precipitation (1825 mm) has been registered on the very wet island of Réunion, and the record eight-days rainfall (3847 mm), was observed at Bellenden Ker, Australia (WMO, 1986) . The precipitation volumes observed in Poland were an order of magnitude lower than these world records noted in entirely different, thus incomparable, climatic conditions. Neither was the areal coverage of the Great Flood of 1997 exceptional by world standards. For instance, the largest daily average precipitation over an area of 129 000 km 2 in the USA was estimated as 160 mm (WMO, 1986) , far greater than for the Great Flood of 1997 in Poland. However, for the region concerned, the intensity, duration and areal coverage of precipitation in July 1997 were indeed exceptionally high (Fig. 2) .
A consideration of the Great Flood of 1997 in the context of other recent major floods in the world is offered in Kundzewicz & Takeuchi (1999) .
Consequences
The nationwide toll for both Odra and Vistula floods of summer 1997 was an all-time high as far as economic losses are concerned. There is no official figure for material losses and the estimates range from 2 to 4 billion US$, indicating that the costs were of much significance to the national economy. The number of fatalities reached 54. The number of flooded towns and villages was 2592 (1362 totally and 1230 partially inundated). The flood caused damage to 46 000 houses and apartments. The number of evacuees was 162 000. Around 665 000 ha of land were flooded, of which over 450 000 ha consisted of agricultural fields. Some 480 bridges were destroyed and 245 damaged. The flood resulted in serious damage to roads and railways, of the order of 3000 km and around 2000 km, respectively. Loss of 1900 cattle, 5900 pigs, 360 sheep and around 1 million poultry was recorded. Embankments were damaged or seriously weakened for a distance of about 1100 km.
Due to destruction of 169 sewage treatment plants, it is estimated that, at the end of July, some 300 000 m 3 of untreated sewage entered the river in one day. The day of 18 July 1997 was declared as a National Mourning Day in remembrance of the victims of the flood.
Framework for flood mitigation
Flood protection and mitigation is the mandate of the Anti-Flood Committee which exists at national, provincial and local levels in Poland. Its activities at the national and provincial levels were subject to heavy criticism during the 1997 deluge, particularly during the first two phases of the flood. The criticism referred to it being an inefficient body, slow in reacting, unable to fulfill its responsibilities such as: co-ordination of evacuation, assistance to flood victims and maintenance of order in inundated areas. It was only perceived to have operated correctly in a limited range of coordinating actions of the army, police, fire brigades and civil defence. In the early phase of the flood, committees, and also some provincial and local authorities could only partly utilize hydrological information and forecasts. Consequently, committees were unable to cope effectively with a gigantic flood, greatly exceeding their expectations and capabilities.
The mandate of the national hydrometeorological service (Institute of Meteorology and Water Management, IMGW) includes responsibility for hydrological networks, observations, data transmission and hydrological forecasting and warning. The two branches of IMGW, responsible for hydrological information and forecasts during the Odra flood, were located in Wroclaw (upper and middle Odra) and Poznan (border stretch and lower Odra).
The rescue operation during and after the flood was the biggest civil and military operation in Poland since the World War II. The numbers of firemen, soldiers and policemen involved were 25 000, 45 000 and 10 000, respectively, while more than 100 000 civilians and volunteers were also directly involved in flood mitigation.
On 8 July 1997, the then Prime Minister, Mr Cimoszewicz, established a highlevel emergency body to fight against the flood, called the Anti-Crisis Committee for Fighting and Mitigation of Flood (ACC), chaired by the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs and vice-chaired by the second author of this contribution. The Committee grouped representatives of seven other ministries (at the level of deputy minister). The mandate of this body, meeting twice a day during the flood, was to coordinate floodrelated operations. It coordinated the translocation of equipment and man-power from other regions of Poland. The Supreme Chamber of Control (NIK, 1998) made a comprehensive analysis of the flood protection activities and issued a statement that the Anti-Crisis Committee played its role adequately in the extreme conditions. Similar opinions were expressed by international observers.
In response to the flood, the Government of Poland adopted a comprehensive National Reconstruction and Modernization Programme (NRMP) comprising action to be taken in three time horizons (immediate, medium-term and long-term). The budget reserve earmarked initially for flood-related expenditures (85 million Zlotys, i.e. about US$24 million) went up to 500 million Zlotys (US$145 million). A package of assistance was offered to flood victims, including financial aid of 3000 Zlotys (nearly US$900, or about three times the average net monthly salary) to every household of flood victims whose houses or apartments were directly damaged or destroyed. Assistance to farmers corresponded to 1 ton of wheat for 1 ha of inundated land. Assistance with fees, taxes, payment of interest on loans, preferential credits and indemnity for death, were also offered.
The flood relief programme has been labelled as the largest humanitarian action in the history of Poland. Considerable assistance came from abroad, from individual countries as well as supra-national bodies such as the European Union.
Flood and politics
A lot of politics has been associated with the flood. At the beginning of the flood, on 7 July 1997, the then Prime Minister, Mr Cimoszewicz, flew into the flood area and issued a sober statement, broadly disseminated by the media, that those who had not been insured could not expect compensation for their losses. Admitting that the state would provide assistance to flood victims, he said that there were no significant reserves in the central budget to be used for this effect.
However, a few hours after the quoted declaration, the flood became very destructive, devastating the town of Klodzko. The Prime Minister regretted his undiplomatic statement and apologized in public two weeks later for his harsh words of 7 July, which had been largely inadequate to the grimness of the situation that subsequently developed. In his address to Parliament he said: "When I visited endangered terrains on the 7th of July in order to assess the situation, it seemed that the flood had dimensions known from earlier experience and one could combat it with conventional means. What started to happen to the upper Odra a few hours later exceeded not only alarm stages, but also the scale of existing imagination about the power of the element." The original statement of the Prime Minister and the efficiency of performance of the authorities in combating the flood were violently criticized by the opposition. Political opponents of the ruling coalition requested the PM to step down and emergency status to be introduced. The government managed to prove that the benefits of emergency status would not add any essential instrument of use in combating the flood, but would considerably increase the inconvenience to the population affected. A side-effect of the emergency status would be a delay to parliamentary elections.
In the election campaign, it was not so much the quality of the argument that counted, but rather the socio-technical criteria of gathering public applause and acceptance. Magnifying every tiny error of one's political opponents, negligible at other times, became weaponry in the pre-election campaign.
Testing public opinion in polls demonstrated that the nation was critical of the central government, and this criticism may have contributed to the defeat of the ruling coalition in the parliamentary elections, as surmised by many an international observer. Also some provincial authorities, that underestimated the danger and did not make a proper use of the forecasts, were strongly criticized. The flood proved the considerable capacity of local authorities, and their performance was commonly perceived more favourably. In several locations, local forces managed to control the situation. This became an argument in a nationwide discussion about the territorial structure of Poland, as to whether or not to replace the country's division into 49 provinces (Polish: wojewôdztwa) by a smaller number of larger and stronger units, and whether or not to introduce an intermediate level of counties (Polish: powiaty) between provinces and municipalities (Polish: gminy). Indeed, a new structure was introduced as of 1 January 1999 (in fact, a similar administrative division had existed until the 1970s).
Flood and the media
The focal theme for the UN International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) in 1998 was Disaster Prevention and the Media. Indeed, the role played by the media in flood preparedness, flood control and flood mitigation cannot be underestimated. Yet, this role may be both positive and negative. Dissemination of a journalist's error, gossip or false information can induce panic and undermine the confidence of those involved in the operation.
The Great Flood of 1997 was extensively covered by the Polish media. For several weeks, it was the dominating topic in the daily press and the principal theme of cover stories of weekly magazines. TV programmes, including regular news and information bulletins from inundated areas, and live broadcasts from the Anti-Crisis Committee meetings, were numerous and gained high viewer ratings. These broadcasts reached an audience of about 5.3 million, the then highest audience of telemetered assessment of public television viewing in Poland (KRRiTV, 1997) .
Floods are a relatively simple phenomenon. Therefore, many journalists, politicians, social activists and other public personalities, including those of the highest echelons, considered it appropriate to share their, typically negative, opinions on the flood defence action via the media.
The flood theme was intimately interwoven into the election campaign in the media. Politicking around the flood became quite common. As a result, a large part of the public could have had the feeling that it was possible to avoid flood losses and that only the inefficiency of the authorities led to the disaster.
In the media, the destruction, panic and chaos in the affected areas of Poland at the beginning of the flood were set against the "Ordnung" (German: order) of the preparatory action on the German side of the border reach and of the lower Odra. Yet, this was when the flood peak was still far upstream, in the Polish reach. When the high water arrived at the Polish-German border reach and the Slubice-Frankfurt/Oder area, it turned out that the levees on the Polish side, subject to massive strengthening efforts, withstood the stress. On the German side, levees broke in several places, resulting in massive inundations and high economic losses.
After decades of censorship, the freedom of the press is now an essential human right in Poland. Yet, during the flood, the absolute freedom of the press did not always go together with responsibility. Chasing sensations did not serve flood defence well. In this country, where so many individuals shared their opinions on the flood through the media, public questioning of individual decisions pertinent to flood mitigation (e.g. whether or not it was necessary to move amphibious vehicles from the centre of Poland into the flooded zone) was not uncommon. Furthermore, the press presented "alternative" weather forecasts, some of which grossly underestimated the precipitation causing the second flood, which was correctly foreseen in the official IMGW forecast. A local TV station in Warsaw disseminated information that a flood wave of 7 m height was approaching the capital city. This false information raised chaos. Tuned to the overall criticism of flood mitigation, journalists nearly laughed at statements regarding possible damage to the safety of levees by rodents.
Calls were expressed for an ethical code for the media during a natural disaster.
Further reading
There is a wealth of literature devoted to the Great Flood of 1997 in Poland. Some references are in Polish (e.g. Stachy & Bogdanowicz, 1998; Kowalczak & Kleinhardt, 1997) . Samples of references in English contained in are: Bronstert et al. (1998a) , Kowalczak ( , 1998a , Kundzewicz (1998) , Szamalek (1998) .
LESSONS LEARNT: COULD THE DISASTER HAVE BEEN AVOIDED?
In the light of objective hydrological data, it is clear that the disaster could not have been avoided. The flood magnitude was exceptionally large. Indeed, if a flood record is doubled, as was the case of the flow rate in the Raciborz-Miedonia, and the flood recurrence interval enters the range of thousands of years, there is no way to avoid high material losses. For decades, people have got used to regular-sized floods on the Odra and its tributaries. They knew where safe places were, where to find shelter for animals and cars. This time, water entered the usually safe places. The event was labelled as "the largest natural disaster in the 1000-year history of Poland", although, in fact, it caused the highest economic losses, but not the most numerous fatalities. The structural flood defences proved to be dramatically inadequate for such a rare flood. There is insufficient storage volume; the 23 weirs on the Odra itself (19 built before the end of the World War II), principally serve navigation and hydropower purposes. There are also several reservoirs on tributaries to the Odra. Some of the reservoirs contributed to mitigating the flooding downstream, but, in general, the existing flood reserve in reservoirs was far too low in the context of the Great Flood of 1997.
There have been plans-which have never come to realization-for a Racibôrz reservoir (close to the Polish-Czech border), which would be the largest reservoir in the drainage basin of the Odra. A multi-purpose Racibôrz reservoir would help overcome a wealth of problems ranging from water supply, through flood control, navigation, water quality (low flow augmentation), hydropower, to recreation, etc. However, despite several decades of debate, the Racibôrz reservoir still exists on drawing boards only. The availability of this reservoir, and one planned for Kamieniec Zabkowicki on the Nysa Klodzka, would have helped reduce the flood losses in 1997.
Opposition to the idea of reservoirs has come from several sources: central administration shifting costly investment into the remote future, inhabitants concerned primarily with the grim necessity of relocation, and environmentalists principally attacking any plans for large reservoirs. The flood of 1997 brought a significant change in the attitude of the general public towards water storage reservoirs. In particular the ability to capture a large flood wave on the River Dunajec, tributary to the Vistula, in the Czorsztyn-Sromowce Wyzne reservoir was a spectacular event. This saved a number of settlements and towns downstream. Before the flood, the newly built reservoir was highly controversial and subject to a violent and long-lasting nationwide dispute.
The event made the general public aware of how dangerous and destructive a flood can be. It also demonstrated where the weaker and stronger points of the flood defence were and helped identify the most important needs.
Weak points and strong points
The flood unveiled the many weak points in the existing flood protection systems where improvements were badly needed. Indeed, every link in the chain of operational flood management (observation-forecast-response-relief) was found to be in need of strengthening.
The existing flood protection system of several larger towns upon the Odra and its tributaries, and for vast areas of agricultural land, are inadequate for a rare flood. Flood defences were designed for smaller, more common floods. They have to fail when exposed to a much higher pressure.
Organization was also a weak point, especially at the beginning of the flood, even when the factors of the extraordinary scale of the event and the effect of shock are considered. Legislation was inadequate; for example, there was a lack of consistent regulations concerning financing of flood action. Financing was based more on ad Mockery, than on a systematic approach. Division of responsibilities and competence was ambiguous. As a result, regional and local authorities were uncertain as to their share in decision making (with financial implications).
It is worth mentioning here that advanced water legislation in Poland has a long tradition. The Water Law of 19 September 1922 (published in 1928 ) contained a chapter on flood protection. However, the turbulent history of Poland in the twentieth century has resulted in several abrupt legislative changes, continuing until recently, as indicated in the present labelling of Poland as a country-in-transition.
The Anti-Flood Committees have never been actually involved in such large-scale action before. Units involved in action had instructions and directives that were out of date (e.g. delegating military units that had ceased to exist, to combat flood). Even the maps in use for flood mitigation were dated. The dissemination of information on floods in provinces, towns and villages in the pre-flood period was very weak to nonexistent. No real civil defence was available; what existed was oriented towards war rather than natural disaster.
The information gap was clearly felt, especially in the first phase of the flood. This resulted from the lack of an automatic observation system, destruction of gauges by the flood, communication breakdown and the evacuation of observers.
On the modelling end, there has been a lack of models for the very high flows which have never occurred in the past. Models with parameters identified traditionally and based on comparison of modelled and observed values, did not hold far beyond the range of "known" conditions. The upsides were: accelerated awareness raising and generation of national solidarity. People fighting the flood at every level (fire brigades, local authorities, army and numerous volunteer civilians) worked hard and persistently, taking rational risks. The saving of towns and land during the third phase of the flood, i.e. the protection of the lower Odra, was a real success story. The activities of Anti-Flood Committees at lower levels was positively perceived. Also the Anti-Crisis Committee was regarded as a useful body and its activity as adequate. The impression of disorder gradually decreased with development of the flood. Indeed, when an event of such an extraordinary scale occurs, time is needed to adapt.
What is needed
The elimination of the weak points detailed above is needed, yet this is a formidable task that cannot be realized in a short time.
In the opinion of the authors, some immediate high priority needs are: -Working out a flood management strategy, including modernization of technical infrastructure (dikes, dams), increasing the available polder and flood plain storage, and non-structural flood protection measures. -Preparation of flood hazard maps, digital terrain models and maps, and software visualizing flood levels in a GIS environment. When such maps become available, the difficult process of winning public acceptance of them should commence. -Execution of zoning principles, which was weakened and partly abandoned because of the lack of a destructive flood for a long time. -Organizational and legislative improvements. Improvement of the coordination of actions and assigning responsibilities in a non-ambiguous way. Precise regulations concerning financing flood action. -Upgrading of the hydrological monitoring system; robust gauges and instrumentation, reliable communication and data transmission systems, broader use of radio and satellite telecommunication, systems of emergency energy supply. -Improvement of the distribution of forecasts and warnings. -Improvement of quantitative precipitation forecasts (qpfs). Due to the short length of tributaries and short lag times between rainfall and runoff in mountainous and highland areas, qpfs are indispensable in real-time modelling of flood formation and propagation in mountain tributaries to the Odra. -Re-evaluation of reservoir operation rules which could help "squeeze" better performance from existing reservoirs. -Training of all those directly involved at all levels of protection activity. Training could embrace the simulation of possible floods and include the financial aspects of flood mitigation (who pays for what). -Enhanced transborder cooperation: exchange of information, data and forecasts, technical assistance, joint training of personnel from all three riparian Odra countries. -Continuous awareness raising of the political elite and the general public.
A YEAR AFTER: CONCLUDING REMARKS
Since 1 January 1999, a new administrative division of Poland has been in operation; the number of provinces has been reduced to one third. Governors of larger and stronger provinces are responsible for flood protection with no excuse of waiting for directives from the centre. Under decentralization it is hoped to make better use of local know-how and experience, in the decision making as well as flood protection practice.
Reconstruction of the hydraulic infrastructure is progressing. However, there is still a lack of an operational radar system. Funding of water management, investment in infrastructure, reservoirs, polders, monitoring and data transmission are still inadequate. The political elites and the general public are reluctant to endorse high expenditure bringing beneficial results in the uncertain (possibly remote) future. There are urgent needs in other areas now, which are likely to give fast, and tangible benefits A year after the Great Flood of 1997, more floods affected Poland. A mediumsized flood in April 1998 caused an over-sensitive reaction. And, for the first anniversary of the Great Flood, in July 1998, a period of intensive precipitation caused a large local flood that devastated towns and villages situated on the Bystrzyca Dusznicka, a tributary to the Odra. Again, fatalities occurred. Weak points evident during the Great Flood of 1997 manifested themselves again: late informing of the population concerned, and delayed reaction of services and the administration to the warnings of IMGW. Déjà vu.
The Great Flood of 1997 was the greatest flood on record in Poland, both in hydrological terms (peak stage, flow, inundated area in the drainage basin of the Odra) and in economic terms (material losses). It was the effect of exceptionally intensive precipitation covering a large area. This very rare hydrological event was superimposed on the complex, changing, socio-economic system of a country-in-transition.
Floods are recurrent natural phenomena and no river riparian nations are immune to them. Wealthy and highly developed countries with advanced flood protection systems, such as Germany, The Netherlands, the USA and Japan, have also suffered high flood losses in the recent past. Even though the precise timing of future destructive floods is not known, they will continue to come. Hence, trying to live with floods is more sustainable than trying to avoid them (Kundzewicz & Takeuchi, 1999; Kundzewicz, 1999) .
